It is sobering to reflect that there were technologies and capabilities available in 1944 that are now abandoned and forgotten, yet might today give decisive advantage in an urban fight. A large-caliber "mortar" capable of indirect and direct fire — something like the 380-millimeter launch on the Sturmtiger — would offer the ground commander an assured form of destructive effect that is currently delivered by guided aircraft bombs.
Furthermore, inert projectiles would offer reliable breaching of substantial walls without the blast hazard of other breaching munitions. Effects can be delivered within seconds of the target being identified, largely avoiding the approval processes for airstrikes. Certainly, such a capability avoids the commitment of a squadron of strike aircraft and refuelling support that is required to keep an armed plane permanently on station.
Self-propelled assault guns such as the Sturmtiger and the ISU-152 were also designed for the close fight, with very heavy armor, and were resistant to the kinetic projectiles of the lighter anti-tank guns they might encounter in an urban area. While shaped and hand-placed explosive charges remained a threat, the vehicles were tough enough to be able to reduce this vulnerability by advancing into their own side's bombardment — or in the case of the Sturmtiger, by using its own mine discharger to suppress infantry nearby.
These vehicles were also extraordinarily robust compared to modern self-propelled guns, which are generally only armored against small-arms fire and shell splinters. This meant that provided the commander was alert for under-floors or cellars and took care to avoid striking main supports, such vehicles could be driven straight through buildings. This toughness was well illustrated during the Chernobyl disaster, when a number of old ISU-152s were used both to ram entries for specialists and as bulldozers to bring down irradiated buildings, literally collapsing walls and roofs on themselves with impunity.
The capability provided by small self-propelled guns, as well as tanks equipped with flamethrowers or demolition guns, would be extraordinarily valuable today — with the clear acknowledgement that while flame weapons are not explicitly prohibited (except against civilians), domestic and international perceptions make their use problematic.
It would also seem that the lessons learned using these manned vehicles during World War II might usefully inform requirements for future platforms. For example, the utility of the forward hatches on the Churchill tank was that it allowed sappers or infantryman to dismount while protected, and this is incidentally the exact capability that Israel has developed on some of its specialist engineering vehicles derived from Centurion tanks, where there is a forward dismounting in the glacis plate.
Importantly, all three of these capabilities — a large-caliber mortar, self-propelled assault guns, and unique tank capabilities — could now be provided by unmanned armored platforms. In particular, spigot mortars offer a way to provide a small tele-operated platform with a very substantial warhead for close-range use.
While Israel has developed and licensed a family of door- and wall-breaching munitions, there has been a curious failure by contemporary armies to adopt these — or their equivalents. Without experience and confidence in their use, it is risky to assert that they would offer radical advantage in building clearing.
Nevertheless, the occasional surviving account of how Russian "storm groups" freely used stocks of captured Panzerfausts to conduct simultaneous multi-entry, through-wall assaults concurrently in cellars and upper stories suggests such potential. The Krummlauf concept — allowing the soldier to engage around cover while remaining hidden — has now been delivered by devices such as the "corner shot," as well as sighting systems where an image from a rifle held around cover is projected to a head-mounted display.
In contrast, there do not appear to be any available equivalents of Nebelwerfer launchers and projectiles. While enhanced blast munitions from shoulder-fired launchers arguably offer dramatically improved terminal effects, these require firers to expose themselves to engage. A direct-fire system that is fired remotely (or even electronically) after setting up, from cover, has great utility in the urban fight.
Possibly the most thought-provoking of the 1944 technologies worth considering are not lethal. A very tough armored vehicle that can move through buildings and obstacles would mitigate some of the tactical challenges presented by the urban fabric. The British Cultivator No. 6 demonstrated that a mole-like trench excavator that advances through an urban area just below the surface is technically possible. A tunneling machine used by ISIS showed that this can be done with modest engineering capability.
Adding the capacity to lay supports on which to spread excavated soil and rubble to form a tunnel appears straightforward. Yet the real significance of these examples is to show that it is possible to build cutting machines for both manned or unmanned armored vehicles to enable them to move through structures by cutting their way rather than ramming.
All of the capabilities described and discussed above had limitations in 1944, and many would be more vulnerable on today's battlefield. Nevertheless, on the streets of Europe commanders had tactical options that we do not have today — options that saved their soldiers' lives — and would still have been valuable in Marawi or Mosul.
It is an indictment that, with few exceptions, we have not exploited contemporary technologies to deliver the special types of effect that offer decision on the urban battlefield. We need to fix that.
Dr. Charles Knight has served with British Army, RAF and several overseas forces and is a lecturer in Terrorism, Asymmetric Conflict & Urban Operations at Charles Sturt University. He developed UK training in Soviet urban doctrine, subterranean recce capability & urban anti-tank guided weapon procedures. He spent a decade in Special Operations development, commanded 2/17 Royal New South Wales Regiment, served in 1 Commando Regiment and developed Australian Army urban doctrine.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.