Powles: Since 2018 the US has sought to increase its diplomatic, defense, and security engagement in the Pacific; as has Australia with its own "Pacific Step Up," New Zealand's "Pacific Reset," and the United Kingdom's "Pacific Uplift,"
This has included big-ticket infrastructure initiatives such as the Papua New Guinea Electrification Partnership, a joint project between Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the United States with the goal of connecting 70% of PNG's population to electricity by 2030. (Currently only 13% have access.)
The US has also created a dedicated director for Oceania position on the National Security Council. We are also seeing an increase in defense and security engagements with Pacific partners and the expansion of diplomatic posts. (Australia opened five new posts; the UK opened three new missions; New Zealand increased its number of diplomatic staff in Pacific posts.)
Australia launched the Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific (AIFFP), a US$1.5 billion Pacific Infrastructure Bank package (although there is valid criticism that the Pacific Island countries don't need more loans).
Although many of these initiatives have been framed in terms of "countering China," there is a futility in this approach. Pacific Island countries have welcomed increased engagement, but there is a degree of cynicism also.
Pacific countries are very aware that this renewed interest in the Pacific is as a result of strategic anxieties about Chinese influence in the region rather than a genuine desire to engage with Pacific countries and support and amplify their interests and issues such as climate change.
Pacific countries have also been clear that they do not wish to be treated as pawns in a wider geopolitical game because they are acutely adept at navigating decades of geopolitical competition.