Milley says that it's a "myth" that it's "possible to quickly generate forces in the event of need." Among the odd things about his proposition are the case studies he cites to support his opinion: World War I and World War II.
The problem? According to the Army itself, at the start of World War I it "was a constabulary force of 127,151 soldiers" with just 181,620 National Guard members. The entire military at the beginning of World War II wasn't much better with only 334,473 in uniform.
That's nothing like where we are in 2019. Unlike 1917 or 1939, today there are almost 2.2 million active, Guard and reserve members of the armed forces.
The whole point of maintaining a large standing military after World War II was to provide a ready capability to respond, and enough troops to hold the line while more were being generated. What may or may not have been the situation in 1917 or 1939 is simply irrelevant today.
I also guess we need to ask how Milley would define "in the event of need" as it seems that key requirements are being met. A little more than a week ago General Terrence O'Shaughnessy, who leads the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), said that "Whether responding to violators of restricted airspace domestically or identifying and intercepting foreign military aircraft, NORAD is on alert 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year."
Additionally, according to DoD, America's nuclear forces "provide 24/7 deterrence to prevent catastrophic actions from our adversaries and they stand ready, if necessary, to deliver a decisive response, anywhere, anytime."
Isn't it true then that the US armed forces can, in fact, generate adequate forces in "the event of need" to meet America's most existential threats? In any event, in assessing America's military needs, shouldn't the CJCS think in terms of more than just ground forces?
Milley also seems to conceive of the "force generation" issue only in terms of ground forces, saying "we need a sizable ground force, and I have advocated for that." In truth, the most daunting challenge today is not personnel, but the time it takes to acquire and field weaponry — more than a decade according to a senior Army officer in 2016.
Even more troubling is the health of the industrial base. In 2018 Defense News reported that the "US is running out of bombs — and it may soon struggle to make more" because of the weakness of America's weapons' manufacturing infrastructure.
Last year a DoD report said that the US "industrial base faces an unprecedented set of challenges" that "erode the capabilities of the manufacturing and defense industrial base and threaten the…ability to be ready for the 'fight tonight,' and to retool for great power competition."
Isn't that the bigger problem in terms of lead time to generate forces? That is, isn't it really about the capability to equip them with the kind of weapons and technology they'll need for the "more complex" wars Milley concedes we face today?