CHILCOT: Blair did NOT tell his cabinet that the government's lawyers initially advised the Iraq War would be illegal

Reuters

Anti war protestors hold up banners showing the face of Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair with the eyes of U.S. President George Bush during a rally in central London, September 28, 2002.

• Tony Blair decided not to show his cabinet legal advice that presented conflicting opinions on whether going to war against Iraq was legal or not in January 2003, the Chilcot report says.
• The initial advice in January 2003 from former attorney general Lord Goldsmith was that the war would not be legal.

Cabinet did not see alternative legal opinions on legality of war

This is the relevant section of the Chilcot Report:

• Cabinet was provided with the text of [former attorney general] Lord Goldsmith's Written Answer to Baroness Ramsey setting out the legal basis for military action.
• That document represented a statement of the Government's legal position - it did not explain the legal basis of the conclusion that Iraq had failed to take "the final opportunity" to comply with its disarmament obligations offered by resolution 1441.
• Cabinet was not provided with written advice which set out, as the advice of 7 March had done, the conflicting arguments regarding the legal effect of resolution 1441 and whether, in particular, it authorised military action without a further resolution of the Security Council.
• The advice should have been provided to Ministers and senior officials whose responsibilities were directly engaged and should have been made available to Cabinet.

In January 2003, just months before the war, Lord Goldsmith - Blair's legal adviser on the upcoming conflict - initially believed war would not be legally justified.

The report says:

Lord Goldsmith's draft advice of 14 January 2003

166. As agreed with Mr Powell on 19 December 2002, Lord Goldsmith handed his
draft advice to Mr Blair on 14 January 2003.

167. The draft advice stated that a further decision by the Security Council would
be required to revive the authorisation to use force contained in resolution 678
(1990) although that decision did not need to be in the form of a further resolution.

168. Lord Goldsmith saw no grounds for self-defence or humanitarian
intervention providing the legal basis for military action in Iraq.

169. Lord Goldsmith's draft advice did not explicitly address the possibility,
identified by the Law Officers in 1997, of other "exceptional circumstances"
arising if the international community "as a whole" had accepted that Iraq had
repudiated the cease-fire, but the Security Council was "unable to act".

The report then adds:

190. In his draft advice of 14 January 2003, Lord Goldsmith wrote that: "In ruling out the use of force without a further decision of the Council, I am not saying that other circumstances may not arise in which the use of force may be justified on other legal grounds, eg if the conditions for self-defence or humanitarian intervention were met. However, at present, I have seen nothing to suggest there would be a legal justification on either of these bases."

After receiving this advice, prime minister Tony Blair set about trying to find the kind of circumstances that would permit a "self-defence" justification for war that would cause Goldsmith's advice to change:

199. Given the consistent and unambiguous advice of the FCO Legal Advisers from March 2002 onwards and Lord Goldsmith's advice from 30 July 2002, that self-defence could not provide a basis for military action in Iraq, the Inquiry has seen nothing to support Mr Blair's idea that a self-defence argument might be
"revived".

200. Lord Goldsmith's draft advice stated that: "It was proposed before Christmas that it would be worthwhile to discuss the negotiation of the resolution and particularly the genesis of the words 'for assessment' with Sir Jeremy Greenstock. It is not clear if and when he will be able to come to London for such a meeting."74

201. Mr Powell sent an undated note to Mr Blair advising: "We should get Jeremy Greenstock over to suggest alternatives to him."

202. Mr Blair replied to Mr Powell: "We need to explore, especially (a) whether we c[oul]d revive the self-defence etc arguments or (b) whether the UNSCR [sic] c[oul]d have a discussion, no resolution authorising force but nonetheless the terms of the discussion and/or decision, make it plain there is a breach."

Tony Blair did not tell his cabinet that the legal advice he had received in January was that going to war would not be legal.

The report says:

231. Mr Blair's decision to ask for Lord Goldsmith's draft advice and his invitation to Lord Goldsmith to attend Cabinet suggest that he intended the advice to inform discussion in Cabinet on 16 January.

232. But Mr Blair did not reveal that he had received Lord Goldsmith's draft advice which indicated that a further determination by the Security Council that Iraq was in material breach of its obligations would be required to authorise the revival of the authority to take military action in resolution 678.

233. As the Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith was the Government's Legal Adviser not just the Legal Adviser to Mr Blair.

234. There is no evidence that Mr Straw was aware of Lord Goldsmith's draft advice before Cabinet on 16 January, although he was aware of Lord Goldsmith's position.

235. There is no evidence that Lord Goldsmith had communicated his concerns to Mr Hoon or to any other member of Cabinet.

236. Mr Blair's decision not to invite Lord Goldsmith to speak meant that Cabinet Ministers, including those whose responsibilities were directly engaged, were not informed of the doubts expressed in Lord Goldsmith's draft advice about the legal basis of the UK's policy.

The 2.6 million-word Iraq Inquiry, dubbed "the Chilcot Inquiry," is the culmination of a huge investigation that was launched by former Prime Minister Gordon Brown in 2009 into the United Kingdom's involvement in the war in Iraq. The report, which is estimated to have cost over £10 million of taxpayers' money, has been chaired by former senior civil servant Sir John Chilcot.

The seven-year investigation into the United Kingdom's decision to go to war in Iraq in 2003 covers political decisions made between 2001 and 2009 relating to the run-up to the UK's intervention, the military action itself, and the aftermath of the conflict.

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